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ABSTRACT 
The United States was born of a normative and political aspiration asserted in its declaration of 
independence. The document did not simply contain a list of reasons for ending colonialization, but 
established equality as key ideal which remained imbedded in the nation’s ethos and is central for the 
U.S. representative democracy. Despite the normative statements of human rights, the status of the 
United States was deeply tainted because the framers of the Constitution retained protections for the 
institution of slavery. But many other legal and cultural anomalies also existed from the inception of 
nationhood, including the subjugation of women and the retention of propertied privileges as 
qualifications for voting and obtaining political offices. Amendments that were made to the 
Constitution after the Civil War (1861-1865) significantly advanced the rule of law but 
simultaneously required greater sincerity in abiding to the founding testament. Reconstruction in the 
United States was achieved through amendment of the original Constitution rather than the enactment 
of a new document. The ratification of the three new legal instruments, known as the Reconstruction 
Amendments, codified the Declaration’s statement of rights and equality. Liberty alone was no 
answer to the problem of slavery. The post-Civil War amendments also prohibited the unequal 
treatment of persons and created new guarantees of the franchise. The judiciary, which was 
responsible for interpreting the new constitutional provisions, showed itself to be a conservative 
institution that reined in reconstruction and thereby diminished the effect of the new guarantees of 
equality.  
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RESUMO 
Os Estados Unidos nasceram de uma aspiração normativa e política afirmada em sua declaração de 
independência. O documento não continha apenas uma lista de razões para acabar com a 
colonialização, mas estabeleceu a igualdade como ideal fundamental, que permaneceu incorporado 
ao ethos da nação e é central para a democracia representativa americana. Apesar das declarações 
normativas de direitos humanos, o status dos Estados Unidos foi profundamente manchado porque 
os autores da Constituição mantiveram proteções ao instituto da escravidão. Mas muitas outras 
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anomalias legais e culturais também existiram desde o início da nação, incluindo a subjugação das 
mulheres e a retenção de privilégios apropriados como qualificação para votar e obter cargos 
políticos. As emendas feitas à Constituição após a Guerra Civil (1861-1865) avançaram 
significativamente o estado de direito, mas simultaneamente exigiram maior sinceridade ao cumprir 
o testamento fundador. A reconstrução nos Estados Unidos foi alcançada por meio de emenda da 
Constituição original, em vez de promulgação de um novo documento. A ratificação dos três novos 
instrumentos legais, conhecidos como Emendas da Reconstrução, codificou a declaração de direitos 
e igualdade da Declaração. Só a liberdade não era resposta para o problema da escravidão. As 
emendas pós-Guerra Civil também proibiram o tratamento desigual de pessoas e criaram novas 
garantias quanto ao direito de voto. O judiciário, responsável por interpretar as novas disposições 
constitucionais, mostrou-se uma instituição conservadora que controlou a reconstrução e, com isso, 
diminuiu o efeito das novas garantias de igualdade. 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE 
Declaração de independência. Igualdade. Reconstrução. Interferência judicial. 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The United States was born of a normative and political aspiration asserted in its declaration 
of independence. The break from British sovereignty occurred on July 2, 1776. Two days later the 
Second Continental Congress immortalized the terms of national identity in a formal Declaration of 
Independence. The document did not simply contain a list of reasons for ending colonialization, as 
was the case with declarations of independence that emerged from the South American independence 
drive of the early nineteenth century. While the U.S. Supreme Court has never formally incorporated 
the Declaration, its mandates of equality remain imbedded in the nation’s ethos and are at the 
foundation of U.S. representative democracy. 
Despite the normative statements of human rights, the status of the United States was deeply 
tainted because the framers of the Constitution retained protections for the institution of slavery. The 
exploitation of African slaves weighed on the country’s conscience from its beginnings. But many 
other legal and cultural anomalies also existed from the inception of nationhood, including the 
subjugation of women and the retention of propertied privileges as qualifications for voting and 
obtaining political offices. 
Amendments that were made to the Constitution after the Civil War (1861-1865) 
significantly advanced the rule of law but simultaneously required greater sincerity in abiding tp the 
founding testament. Reconstruction in the United States was achieved through amendment of the 
original Constitution rather than the enactment of a new document. The ratification of the three new 
legal instruments, known as the Reconstruction Amendments, codified the Declaration’s statement 
of rights and equality. The evolving quest to define the founding ideals did not end with the abolition 
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of slavery. Liberty alone was no answer to so great an evil. The post-Civil War amendments also 
prohibited the unequal treatment of persons and created new guarantees of the franchise. The 
judiciary, which was responsible for interpreting the new constitutional provisions, showed itself to 
be a conservative institution that reined in reconstruction and thereby diminished the effect of the 
new guarantees of equality. 
 
1 THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND THE QUEST FOR LIBERTY 
 
The founding generation of Americans set the nation on a course of liberty. They presented 
the country’s ideals in general statements based on natural rights philosophy. Revolutionaries 
regarded rights to be innate, not merely the products of positive law. The emerging political 
philosophy of the eighteenth century conceived the rights of the people to be equally possessed at 
birth and divinely granted. They were not endowed by man and therefore could not be “repealed or 
restrained by human law” and existed prior “to all early government.”1 
Civil society was thought to be a system operated for the mutual improvements beneficial to 
all members of the polity. Enlightened jurists like Theophilus Parsons, a future member of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court, envisioned civility in which 
 
each individual parts with the power of controuling his natural alienable rights, only when 
the good of the whole requires it; he therefore has remaining, after entering into political 
society, all his unalienable natural rights, and a part also of his alienable natural rights, 
provided the good of the whole does not require the sacrifice of them.2 
 
The measure of a government’s authority was the consent of individuals to join a civil order 
that was committed to coequal rights for the common defense and self-improvement. 
On their face, the revolutionary ideals prohibited infringement of others’ equal rights and 
natural freedoms. This did not justify libertinism; to the contrary, the people’s representatives were 
expected to pass laws that constrained individuals for the common good3. Even slaveholders of the 
day proclaimed their affinity for liberty even though their conduct contravened the country’s avowed 
philosophy. Anti-slavery forces were only in their nascent state, barely organized in the late 
eighteenth century, but they were beginning to articulate condemnations, in written and oral forms, 
 
1 Result of the Convention of Delegates Holden at Ipswich…, in MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359, 365 (Boston, 
1861) (1778); John Adams, A Dissertation on the Canon & Feudal Law, in 3 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 447, 449 
(Charles F. Adams ed., 1851) (1782); Hampden, THE ALARM (No. III) (Oct. 15, 1773). 
2 Result of the Convention of Delegates Holden at Ipswich in the County of Essex, in THEOPHILUS PARSONS, MEMOIR OF 
THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359, 367 (Boston, 1861) (1778). 
3 Spartanus, The Interest of America, NEW-HAMPSHIRE GAZETTE, June 15, 1776; JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE 
§54, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 346 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press rev. ed.1965) (1690). 
 P á g i n a  | 78 
BIRTH & RECONSTRUCTION OF EQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 
REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO – UFPR | CURITIBA, VOL. 64, N. 3, SET./DEZ. 2019 | P. 75 – 106 
against the county’s failure to live up to its ideals. While the founding generation contravened the 
rights of blacks, women, and others, they established national principle to which later generations 
could later turn to end injustices that were tolerated at the time of independence. 
Of all the pamphlets and documents drafted by revolutionaries, none was as elegant, pithy, 
and influential as the Declaration of Independence. It listed reasons for the break with the Mother 
Country and, more importantly, stated the moral reasons for creating a separate nation. The document 
contained an ethical theory for peoplehood borne of a joint aspiration to end tyranny and achieve 
justice. 
While the framers of American independence embraced inborn equal liberty, they failed to 
condemn slavery and misogyny. The Continental Congress even eliminated a paragraph in Thomas 
Jefferson’s draft against the international slave trade. The Declaration nevertheless contained 
principles that, in the words of one of the prominent leaders of early America, was “the political creed 
of the United States.”4 
Their wavering on principle did not diminish the significance the universal statements about 
the universalizability of liberal equality. The persistence in their culture of systematic inequality, 
toward blacks, native Americans, and women was glaringly inapposite with the vehement claim that 
civil law had to follow the “law of natural reason and equity.”5 Civil rights, belonging to everyone, 
were “not to be rummaged for, among old parchments” but discovered in human nature6. 
The national thesis that government must protect personal equality and ability to enjoy 
liberty was incompatible with the lack of legal protection against the prevailing and overt racial and 
gender discrimination. Some writings on the state of nature even conceived of a human condition, 
prior to the creation of governments in which no one was superior to anyone else. Civil order was 
meant to aggregate human power to protect rights against the precarious forces of greed and 
selfishness7. Yet it was cynical to speak of creating a meritocracy to better preserve “equality to the 
most extensive degree,”8 while closing off opportunities to education, political, ownership, and many 
other rights that were open to men with adequate wealthy. Without equal access to the privileges of 
 
4 Samuel Adams, To the Legislature of Massachusetts, in 4 THE WRITINGS OF SAMUEL ADAMS 353, 357 (Jan. 17, 1794). 
5 Samuel Adams, The Rights of the Colonists (Report of the Committee of Correspondence to the Boston Town Meeting 
Nov. 20, 1772), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/bcp/right_col.htm. 
6 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED 38 (1775). 
7 JUDAH CHAMPION, CHRISTIAN AND CIVIL LIBERTY CONSIDERED & RECOMMENDED 7 (1776); A Full Vindication, in 1 
THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 6 (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 2d ed. 1904) (1774). 
8 BOSTON GAZETTE & COUNTRY JOURNAL (Jan. 21, 1771) (signed “Vindex”); VIRGINIA GAZETTE (Dixon & Hunter) (June 
8, 1776) at 2 (signed at the next publication date, June 15, 1776, as “Philanthropos”); DAVID RAMSAY, AN ORATION ON 
ADVANTAGES OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 3, 7 (1778). 
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citizenship, most American inhabitants were barred from meaningfully engaging in the political, 
cultural, and social life. 
The most glaring contradiction was in access to the voting booth. If there was one complaint 
that could summon up the colonists’ disaffection it was, “No Taxation without Representation.” Yet 
many Americans were disaffected, disfranchised, and paid taxes without being able to vote or run for 
public offices. Seven colonies–New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Virginia, 
North Carolina, and Georgia–predicated suffrage on the possession of real estate, while the others 
also granted the vote to male taxpayers or those with a set minimum amount of personal property. 
Other groups, like women, juveniles, blacks, Native Americans, Jews, Catholics, and indentured 
servants were explicitly excluded from casting ballots9. The majority of the population either lacked 
a political voice or did not exercise it. 
 
2 CONTRADICTIONS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 
 
The ideals of the Declaration of Independence raised expectations that in the new republic 
the people’s inalienable rights would be preserved for the betterment of their safety and happiness. 
There was a general consensus in the early years of independence that the exploitation of slave labor 
was despotic. Slavery had been a norm since the mid-seventeenth century, but the new talk of equality 
in the nation’s constitutional documents made the institution aberrational from the terms of national 
compact. The stated justifications for waging revolution were incompatible with the exploitation of 
humans as chattel. 
The very language colonists used to justify the violent struggle put British attempts to 
enforce commerce laws – including the Tea Act of 1773, the Boston Port Act of 1774, and the 
Massachusetts Government Act of 1774 – as forms of enslavement. Josiah Quincy, Jr., a prominent 
member of the Sons of Liberty, exclaimed “Britons are our oppressors–I speak it with shame–I speak 
it with indignation–we are slaves.”10 A signer of the Declaration of Independence, Stephen Hopkins, 
equated the colonists’ status of having to pay a tax without being able to participate in Parliamentary 
debates before its passage to “the miserable condition of slavery.”11 There were some, such as John 
Allen, who opposed the British Acts while refusing to stay silent about African slavery made leaders 
mere “trifling patriots,” and “pretended votaries of Freedom” who trampled upon the natural rights 
 
9 CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC 19 (1953). 
10 QUINCY, JR., OBSERVATIONS ON THE ACT OF PARLIAMENT… 69 (1774). 
11 HOPKINS, THE RIGHTS OF COLONIES EXAMINED 4 (1764). 
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and privileges of Africans while putting on a “vain parade of being advocates of the liberties of 
mankind.”12 
Of course, it was people of African descent who experienced the most disproportionate 
deprivations. The complaints of white colonists were trifling compared to the ubiquitous intolerance 
they suffered. Most were unable to voice their concerns, in large part because as slaves they lived 
oppressed lives and those of them who were free found doors shut to their enjoyment of the privileges 
of citizenship. There were those who would not be cowed, those who acquired ample skills for protest. 
A group of Massachusetts blacks, petitioned the state legislature in 1777 to “be Restored to the 
Enjoyments of that which is the Natural Right of all men” lest “the Inhabitance of this States No 
longer [be] chargeable with the inconsistancey of acting themselves the part which they condemn and 
oppose in others.” In a separate petition, “A Son of Africa” condemned the hypocrisy of entering the 
fray with the British while remaining silent about the continuation of slavery of Africans whom God, 
“by the law of nature, gave everything […] equally alike to everyman richly to enjoy.”13 This was not 
an isolated case. 
Groups of black petitioners were found throughout America, including those from New 
Hampshire who argued deductively that accepting the proposition that “freedom is an inherent right 
of the human species” entails that slavery is a detestable tyranny. Black petitioners from 
Massachusetts convinced a convention to adopt the resolution, 
 
That we abhor the enslaving of any of the human race, and particularly of the negroes in this 
country, and that whenever there shall be a door opened, or opportunity present for anything 
to be done towards the emancipation of the negroes, we will use our influence and endeavor 
that such a thing may be brought about.14 
 
Fewer references were made to the inequalities women experienced, but the argument was 
available for anyone willing to listen. Mary Wollstonecraft, who published what may be characterized 
as the first feminist declaration of independence, took revolutionaries to task for establishing society 
on the premise of equality while chaining “half of mankind” to gender subordination15. Abigail 
Adams cajoled her husband John Adams, one of the most prominent members of the Continental 
 
12 JOHN ALLEN, THE WATCHMAN’S ALARM TO LORD – - -H 27-28 (1774). 
13 Quoted in Thomas J. Davis, Emancipation Rhetoric, Natural Rights, and Revolutionary New England: A Note on Four 
Black Petitions in Massachusetts, 1773-1777, 62 NEW ENG. Q. 248, 262 (1989); PHILIP S. FONER, FROM AFRICA TO THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE COTTON KINGDOM 303 (1975). 
14 3 COLLECTIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 432-33 (5th ser. 1877); Thomas J. Davis, Emancipation 
Rhetoric, Natural Rights, & Revolutionary New England: A Note on Four Black Petitions in Massachusetts, 1773-1777, 
62 NEW ENG. Q. 248, 255, 261 (1989); WILLIAM LINCOLN, HISTORY OF WORCESTER, MASSACHUSETTS 99 (1862). 
15 A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN 247 (1792); About Wollstonecraft see Introduction to Mary Wollstonecraft, 
VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN 7 (M. Broday ed., 1986); A BOOKSHELF OF OUR OWN: WORKS THAT CHANGED 
WOMEN’S LIVES 16 (Deborah G. Felder ed., 2005). 
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Congress and later President of the United States, that he and fellow delegates “remember the ladies” 
in working out details of political representation16. In response John simply wrote back that he found 
the request to be humorous17, despite his commitment to natural rights, which he evidently did not 
believe fully extended to females. With political offices closed to her, Abigail could do little more 
than voice her opinion to statesmen. Nor was this the only issue on her mind. She also wrote John to 
end slavery, which regarded to be “a most iniquitous scheme.”18 
A speaker at an 1800 Independence Day celebration held sentiments similar to Adams’s. 
Celebration of national separation from England, she argued, should not be a commemoration of 
military victory nor of sovereignty but “because the American people have calmly, and deliberately 
declared, that ‘all men are created EQUAL.” If this phrase is understood to “embrace only half of 
mankind,” she went on to say, it amounts to “only half systems, and will not more support the burden 
of humanity.” The Declaration taught principles for the sons and daughters to realize their equal 
competence for great attainments. So too, the “rights of sufferages [sic]” were of equal importance to 
men and women. She went on to also bemone the fate of Africans forced to migrate to the United 
States, “Ethiop! Suffering brother” and implored him to 
 
curse us not–some of us have principles of justice and bowels of compassion […] Africa! 
Africa! […] Where we have excited murders, robberies, and burnings, that we might punish 
them in our won land with endless, hopeless slavery, on the victims of our subtilty [sic] and 
their innocent posterity–Declaration of Independence! Where art thou now? 
 
While America had understood the Declaration to end British aristocracy, visionary 
Americans could readily see that the system would need to be reconstructed, staying true to principle 
but abandoning the substantial privileges of sex and race19. 
The egalitarian understanding of the Revolution was not, however, the mainstream view. A 
speaker actually justified inequality as pragmatically justifiable, despite the Declaration of 
Independence’s statement on liberal equality. William Hunter spoke at an 1801 Fourth of July 
celebration to defend the “utility and expediency” of not allowing blacks and women to vote. He 
patronizingly rationalized that women were excluded from the franchise because they were so 
“interesting, fascinating, with power to direct us” that once in politics they were likely to “engross a 
complete monopoly of power.” He also believed persons of African dissent should be prevented from 
 
16 Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams, ADAMS FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE, Mar. 31, 1776 (L. H. Butterfield ed., 
1963). 
17 Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, Id., Apr. 14, 1776. 
18 Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams, Id., Sept. 22, 1774. 
19 [Written by a Lady], AN ORATION DELIVERED ON THE FOURTH DAY OF JULY 1800 4, 5, 11 (Springfield: Henry Brewer 
1808). 
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representative governance because they were “extremely dependent, extremely ignorant, extremely 
indigent, and fiercely barbarous.”20 His statements ignored that federal and state legal systems 
prohibited women and blacks from gaining the training and participation necessary to engage in civics 
on an equal level. 
 
3 ABOLITIONIST INFLUENCE 
 
Statements about natural equality made during the Early Republic influenced the course of 
emancipation throughout New England and parts of the middle-Atlantic. But the early zeal for 
immediate or gradual liberation dissipated as slavery became entrenched. Contrary to the hopes of 
prominent revolutionaries like Benjamin Rush and John Jay, adoption of the Declaration’s statement 
of universal rights did not lead to slavery’s immediate demise. The Bill of Rights’ protections against 
the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”, existed side-by-side with 
other sections of the Constitution, like the Three-fifths Clause, which countenanced human bondage. 
Only during the Reconstruction would the Declaration of Independence’s ideals of equal inalienable 
rights become incorporated into the Constitution. Constitutional reformation of the mid-nineteenth 
century was influenced by earlier abolitionist efforts. 
Gradual abolitionism began to spread during the American Revolution, when ideas of liberty 
and equality spread widely throughout the colonies. In the late eighteenth century abolitionist 
societies existed in states like Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New York. Authors 
condemned the institution heralding from North Carolina, Delaware, Rhode Island, and Maryland21. 
But it was only after the 1819 and 1820 debates on the Missouri Compromise that debate about the 
legitimacy of slavery took on national proportion. From that point, immediate abolitionists and 
gradualist anti-slavery authors set arguments later adopted by the post-Civil War Reconstruction 
Congress. 
A full throated defense of equal human rights entered the U.S. Constitution in the mid-1860s, 
but the ideal developed in the pages of nineteenth century books and pamphlets that condemned 
slavery. In 1835, a leader of Unitarian anti-slavery efforts, made clear that the condemnation of the 
institution rested on the Declaration of Independence’s defense of “the indestructible rights of every 
human being.” Slavery stripped “man of the fundamental right to inquire into, consult, and seek his 
 
20 WILLIAM HUNTER, AN ORATION, DELIVERED IN TRINITY CHURCH, IN NEWPORT ON THE FOURTH OF JULY, 1801, at 9-10 
(1801). 
21 ALEXANDER TSESIS, FOR LIBERTY AND EQUALITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 53-
54 (2012). 
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own happiness.”22 In his 1839 book American Slavery as It Is Theodore Weld, an abolitionist with a 
national reputation, in and out of the halls of Congress, declaimed a breadth of issues the 
Reconstruction Congress would later confront. The evils he discussed included plunder of “bodies 
and minds, their time and liberty and earnings, their free speech and rights of conscience, their right 
to acquire knowledge, and property, and reputation.”23 
A few visionary Northern congressmen also advocated this principled perspective. Many 
statements in Congress against the spread of slavery were made in the midst of debates about terms 
for territories seeking to enter the union as full fledged states. Senator Charles Sumner was among 
the foremost proponents of the view that federal power should extend to all territories and possessions 
of the United States. A representative statement appears during the Kansas/Nebraska debates on the 
terms of statehood. “Slavery,” Sumner stated, “is an infraction of the immutable law of nature, and, 
as such, cannot be considered a natural incident to any sovereignty, especially in a country which has 
solemnly declared, in its Declaration of Independence, the inalienable right of all men to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness.”24 He not only spoke from the authority of natural law but also from the 
norm of the founding, national compact. 
Abolitionists, whose writings and speeches influenced the framers of the Reconstruction 
Amendments, understood their efforts against slavery to be tied to the ethical values of independence. 
William Lloyd Garrison, the most important of all the immediate abolitionists, believed the end of 
slavery and women’s equality to be implicit in the self-evident truths of the Declaration of 
Independence25. While Garrison thought of the pre-reconstructed constitution to be a compact born 
of hell26, other authors were more textual, for example linking abolition to the dictates of the General 
Welfare Clause27.  
 
4 RECONSTRUCTION IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
The Union victory in the U.S. Civil War did much more than alter the relationship between 
states and the federal government. It set in motion constitutional changes that overturned social 
 
22 WILLIAM E. CHANNING, SLAVERY 47-48 (3d ed. 1835). 
23 THEODORE D. WELD, AMERICAN SLAVERY AS IT IS 7-8 (1839). 
24 CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 268 (1854). 
25 See WILLIAM L. GARRISON, AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE OLD COLONY ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, AT SOUTH 
SCITUATE, MASS. 17 (1839) (“[I]f we advocate gradual abolition, we shall perpetuate what we aim to destroy, and 
proclaim that the self-evident truths of the Declaration of Independence are self-evident lies.”). 
26 3 WENDELL P. & FRANCIS J. GARRISON, WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON, 1805-1879, at 412 (1889). 
27 GEORGE W. F. MELLEN, AN ARGUMENT ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY 62 (1841); CHARLES OLCOTT, 
TWO LECTURES ON SLAVERY AND ABOLITION 88 (1838). 
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hierarchies, ending oligarchical control of southern lands, through three Reconstruction 
Amendments: The Thirteenth Amendment was ratified in 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, 
and the Fifteenth Amendment becoming part of the Constitution in 1870. In a short period, the United 
States had won a physical war against Confederate secession and an ethical war for freedom and 
liberty. 
Congress had begun debating the Thirteenth Amendment even before hostilities had ended 
between the North and South. Many of speakers vehemently decried slavery and those customs and 
practices that discriminated against blacks. The language of the Thirteenth Amendment, which was 
ratified in December 1865, was particularly simple and, like the rest of the Constitution rather pithy: 
“Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the 
party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist in the United States, or any place subject to their 
jurisdiction. Sec. 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” 
Congressmen who spoke in favor of the Amendment regarded its grand design to be far more than 
the literal text. 
Missing from this wording was any mention of human equality. Charles Sumner had initially 
demanded addition of a clause providing that “all persons are equal before the law.”28 Its exclusion 
from the final version was not for lack of agreement with Sumner’s sentiments. To the contrary, as 
Senator Jacob Howard believed, equality was built into constitutional abolition of slavery29. 
Congressman Isaac Arnold, a legislator with close connections to President Abraham Lincoln, 
asserted that Section 2 of the Amendment provided Congress the authority to pass laws guaranteeing 
that “equality before the law” would “be the great cornerstone” of American governance30. 
Advocates of the Thirteenth Amendment thought of it not only as a reconstruction of the 
Constitution, but also a return to the founding ideals. In 1863, the year President Abraham Lincoln 
issued the Emancipation Proclamation, the National Convention of German Radicals announced their 
goals to “[a]bolition of slavery […] [and r]evision of the Constitution in the spirit of the Declaration 
of Independence.”31 Similarly in Winter 1864, the Freedom Convention met in Louisville and 
expressed conviction that amending the Constitution was essential “to secure freedom to every 
person,” in keeping with “the principles of freedom announced by the Declaration of Independence 
and the Federal Constitution.”32 A column in the abolitionist newspaper The Liberator, asserted that 
 
28 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 521 (Feb. 8, 1864). 
29 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1488 (Apr. 8, 1864). 
30 Id. at 2989 (June 15, 1864). 
31 The German Radical Convention, CLEVELAND DAILY HERALD, Oct. 24, 1863, at 3. 
32 The Eastern News: To-day’s Dispatches, DAILY EVENING BULL. (S.F.), Feb. 25, 1864, at 2. 
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an amendment ending slavery “will give completeness and permanence to emancipation, and bring 
the Constitution into avowed harmony with the Declaration of Independence.”33 
Similar sentiments were heard overseas. An attorney from Manchester, England wrote a 
friend in support of ratifying the constitutional amendment to abolish slavery: “Then will your first 
great Declaration of Independence become indeed a solid, enduring, noble reality, securing freedom 
as the birthright of all men.” He continued that returning to the nation’s founding principles would 
help secure liberty as the human birthright to go hand-in-hand with “the precious heritage of liberty-
-equal rights and privileges of citizenship.”34 John Stuart Mill, the great utilitarian philosopher, wrote 
from England to encourage a friend to work toward ratification of the Amendment in order to “to 
break altogether the power of the slaveholding caste” and observe “the opening words of the 
Declaration of Independence.”35 
Abolition wrought no small change in a country where slavery had flourished for more than 
two centuries. Not only did the Amendment end a far-reaching abuse of human rights. It also changed 
the federalist relationship between states and the national government by granting Congress much 
broadened powers over civil rights reforms. Congressman James F. Wilson of Iowa, chairman of the 
powerful House Judiciary Committee, emphasized how the Amendment fundamentally altered the 
structure of American government because it conferred Congress with the authority to pass laws even 
after slaves had been emancipated. Wilson understood that Section 2 granted Congress authority to 
pass laws to secure “human equality”, whereby persons of all races would be “equals, before the 
law.”36 While the Amendment did not explicitly provide the right to vote, it was a necessary corollary 
to the advancement of political participation37. 
In practical terms that seemed to mean that Congress could now realize the abolitionist ideal 
of protecting rights first identified in the Declaration of Independence. Senator James Harlan of Iowa, 
another confidant of the Lincoln family, believed national laws could now pass to prohibit 
discrimination against black service on juries, possession of property, and enjoyment of marriage38. 
 
33 Universal Emancipation, Liberator (Bos.), May 6, 1864, at 1 (reprinting an extract from an April 8, 1864 speech 
delivered in the United States Senate by Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts). 
34 Letter from Thomas H. Barker to William Lloyd Garrison (Mar. 4, 1865), in Letter from Thomas H. Barker, Esq., 
LIBERATOR (Bos.), Mar. 31, 1865, at 50. 
35 John Stuart Mill, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, June 8, 1865, at 2. 
36 Id. at 1319 (Mar. 28, 1864). 
37 A Maryland representative to the House, speaking in Chicago, saw constitutional abolition to be a critical step in 
formulating a government under which “colored people” would have access to the ballot box and stated that “[t]hen all 
the principles of the Declaration of Independence will be executed; this government will rest on the rights of individual 
liberty and the right of every man to bear a share in the government of the country.” Henry Winter Davis on Negro 
Suffrage, VT. WATCHMAN & ST. J., July 14, 1865, at 2. 
38 Id. at 1439-40 (Apr. 6, 1864).  
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Reconstruction for Harlan and fellow Radical Republicans heralded the nation’s reawakening to its 
foundational potential, which had been squandered for the sake unity but at the expense of black 
liberty. Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, who wrote a book condemning the grave subjugation 
of slavery, articulated the vision of the reconstructed Constitution that allowed obliteration of “the 
last lingering vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing, degrading, and bloody codes; its dark, 
malignant, barbarizing spirit; all it was and is, everything connected with it or pertaining to it.”39 
Harlan and Wilson brought their abolitionist ideals to constitution-making. They and their 
fellow Radical Republicans in Congress relied on the Declaration of Independence and Preamble to 
the Constitution. With the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment they expected the foundational 
principles of American constitutional democracy to no longer be theoretical but practical. All races 
of man, they imagined, would henceforth be on an equal footing enjoying “that self-evident truth that 
[all men] are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights.” 
Visionary congressmen who held influential political offices by the end of the Civil War and 
shortly thereafter planned to pass legislation pursuant to Section 2 for the furtherance of life, liberty, 
the pursuit of happiness, and betterment of the general welfare. They worked under the conviction 
that a true “state of freedom” included not simply an end to bondage but also the enjoyment of marital 
rights and the benefits of free labor. Putting an end to the badges and incidents of slavery and 
involuntary servitude not only benefitted persons of African descent but also “the seven millions of 
poor white people” whom “slavery […] kept […] in ignorance, in poverty and in degradation.”40 New 
Hampshire Senator John Hale called on Americans to “wake up to the meaning of the sublime truths” 
that the country’s “fathers uttered years ago and which have slumbered dead letters upon the pages 
of our Constitution, of our Declaration of Independence, and of our history.”41 Others took a different 
tact, accusing “our ancestors” of hypocrisy for proclaiming the “inalienable right of liberty unto all 
men”, while refusing it to others42. In keeping with the view that Reconstruction was tied to the 
aspirations of independence, the Enforcement Clause was regarded to be legislative authority to pass 
civil rights law “to give practical effect to the principles of the Declaration of Independence.”43 
The Amendment authorized Congress to enforce laws against private and public injustices 
that are incidental to slavery or involuntary servitude. This was a substantial break with the extant 
 
39 Id. at 1324 (Mar. 28, 1864). 
40 Id. at 2990 (June 15, 1864) (Representative Ebon Intersoll); see also id. at 1324 (March 28, 1864) (Wilson); id. at 1199 
(Mar. 19, 1864) (Wilson). 
41 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1443 (Apr. 6, 1864). 
42 Id. at 1461 (Apr. 7, 1864) (Senator John Henderson). 
43 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (Mar. 2, 1866) (Representative William Windom). 
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concept of federalism, which had left civil rights at the behest of the states. The Second Section of 
the Amendment provided the federal government greater deliberative and legislative powers over 
civil rights. While the principles remained those of the nation’s founding, the Thirteenth Amendment 
reconstructed the form of government Americans had employed since the Revolution. The substantive 
rights enumerated by the Bill of Rights as well as unenumerated, natural rights, mentioned in the 
Ninth Amendment, became the boons of national citizenship, not subject to state infractions. The 
reason for this change was to achieve policy integrity commensurate with the ideal of individual rights 
being equally protected throughout the country. The benefits of this rebirth of revolutionary mandates 
included the rights to enjoy the rights to contract; sue; testify in court; and inherit, purchase, lease, 
hold and convey real property. This view overlapped with those of other, stated by Senator Harlan 
and Iowa Representative John A. Kasson, who believed the Thirteenth Amendment allowed Congress 
to pass laws against unfair restrictions on family, property, and judicial autonomy. 
 
5 AFTERMATH OF ABOLITION 
 
There were immediate signs of liberalization. A former slave, Charlotte Brown, spoke 
rapturously of the first Sunday of her emancipation. She recalled everyone “sittin’ roun’ restin’ an’ 
tryin’ to think what freedom meant an’ ev’ybody.” All of a sudden, an old woman started talking of 
the oppressions being lifted from those on the plantation. All of a sudden the former hands began to 
sing and dance in jubilation44. Schools sprang up with many freed people exploring opportunities for 
new vocations, Bible reading, literacy, and self improvement. Classrooms were open for children and 
adults. This development was a major break from oppression because prior to ratification of the 
Thirteenth Amendment, the only slave states that permitted educational instruction were Tennessee, 
Maryland, and Kentucky. In some states instructors could be imprisoned, fined, or whipped. Because 
of these oppressive regimes, only ten percent of southern black adults were literate in 1860. 
Benevolence societies and the U.S. Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands, 
better known as the Freedmen’s Bureau, ran schools to eliminate illiteracy, one of the most 
devastating incidents of slavery. Federal involvement in education was a significant aspect of federal 
reconstruction because schools had previously been the exclusive province of states rather than 
national powers. To give a sense of the endeavor’s scope, in North Carolina societies and religious 
organizations enrolled 11,826 students. In addition, the Freedmen’s Bureau operating in the state 
 
44 WEEVILS IN THE WHEAT: INTERVIEWS WITH VIRGINIA EX-SLAVES 58-59 (Perdue et al. eds., 1976). 
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employed 439 teachers to educated about 20,000 pupils in 413 schools. In Alabama, the Bureau 
protected and helped transport northern teachers, pay for school construction, facility rental, and 
salary payments. Despite these positives, most schools were segregated45. 
In response, local and roaming gangs attacked teachers and students in keeping with the 
concerted effort to retain centuries of inequality despite the dramatic changes to the Constitution. 
Moreover, some states enacted child apprenticeship laws, which bound children to employers for 
extended terms of service and thereby rendered education out of their reach. Judges reviewing 
challenges to these laws were authorized to evaluate the child’s best interest, a subjective standard 
that allowed culturally imbedded racism to be determinative rather than a standard of fundamental 
rights46. 
Even more oppressive than indenture law, which in 1867 the Bureau ordered revoked, were 
black codes. Shortly after ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, plantation owners in the former 
slave states relied on these oppressive measures to continue oppressive labor practices despite the 
social reconstruction heralded by the Thirteenth Amendment. Among the most pernicious of blacks 
codes were requirements for adhesion contracts demanding black employees continue working as 
exploited labor for their former slaveholders, barring former slaves from seeking employment 
elsewhere. For example, Georgia required black “servants” who worked over a month for “masters” 
to sign binding agreements. Any worker who quit before the expiration of his employment contract 
forfeited all past wages and was subject to imprisonment and a $500 fine. Another Georgia state law 
was of a different type: It granted employers the power to fire laborers without pay because of 
“disobedience […] immorality, and want of respect.” Laborers could thus claim no job security, 
forcing many to subject themselves to effective indentured peonage in order to support families. The 
state of Mississippi subjected laborers to arrest and loss of wages for refusing to work for the duration 
 
45 WILLIAM PRESTON VAUGHN, SCHOOLS FOR ALL: THE BLACKS & PUBLIC EDUCATION IN THE SOUTH, 1865-1877, at 1 
(1974); ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at 96 (Perennial Library 
1989) (1988); Ivan E. McDougle, The Social Status of the Slave, 3 J. NEGRO HIST. 281, 289 (1918); Danger: An Educated 
Black Man, 22 J. BLACKS IN HIGHER EDUC. 19 (Winter, 1998-1999); Janet Cornelius, “We Slipped and Learned to Read”: 
Slave Accounts of the Literacy Process, 1830-1865, 44 PHYLON 171, 176, 183 (1983); James A. Padgett, From Slavery 
to Prominence in North Carolina: Preparation, 22 J. NEGRO HIST. 433, 435 (1937); John B. Myers, The Education of the 
Alabama Freedmen During Presidential Reconstruction, 1865-1867, 40 J. NEGRO EDUC. 163, 167 (1971); Sandra E. 
Small, The Yankee Schoolmarm in Freedmen’s Schools: An Analysis of Attitudes, 45 J. S. HIST. 381, 381 (1979); Letter 
from Edmonia G. Highgate to M. E. Strieby, Dec. 17, 1866, in WE ARE YOUR SISTERS: BLACK WOMEN IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 298-99 (Dorothy Sterling ed., 1984); KENNETH M. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION, 1865-
1877, at 139 (1969). 
46 James Hammond, Letter to an English Abolitionist, in THE IDEOLOGY OF SLAVERY 191-92 (1981); AVERY CRAVEN, 
RECONSTRUCTION: THE ENDING OF THE CIVIL WAR 119-20 (1969); Gilbert T. Stephenson, Racial Distinctions in Southern 
Law, 1 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 44, 47-48 (1906); HERBERT G. GUTMAN, BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY & FREEDOM, 1750-1925, 
at 207-09 (1976). 
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of the employment contract. Major General Hatch told the Congressional Joint Committee of Fifteen, 
investigating Southern postbellum behavior, that whites in Mississippi “wish to control the negro and 
his labor in such a way that he will be compelled to remain with them for never less than a year, and 
upon their own terms.”47 
In response to these draconian laws, Congress began using its enforcement power to pass 
laws to end de facto slavery. The existence of the 1865 amendment to the Constitution prevented 
states from claiming exclusive sovereignty over the liberties of its citizens. Radical Republicans 
understood the Amendment to have empowered them to end discriminations that impinged on 
fundamental rights and interfered with the general welfare; moderates, on the other hand, did not 
believe that the Thirteenth Amendment had gone that far, regarding reconstruction to have only 
extended to labor and property rights. Nevertheless thee was enough support in Congress to pass 
several reconstruction laws. The most important of these was the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which 
until this day remains in effect and used for real estate and contract discrimination. Other laws 
prohibited forced labor, punished slavery, and extended the federal judiciary’s power to hear writs of 
habeas corpus48. 
The 1866 Acts prohibition against public and private acts of discrimination in labor contracts 
was a radical departure from pre-bellum understanding of national unity. It advanced republican 
governance by extending federal government accountability to its citizens. Opening courts that had 
formerly been closed to black litigants, empowered individuals to use the federal courts to vindicate 
rights first announced in the Declaration of Independence. Reconstruction superseded discriminatory 
state tort, contract, and penal laws.  
 
6 CONTINUED RECONSTRUCTION OF FEDERALISM: FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
 
Several influential congressional leaders found that the Thirteenth Amendment’s wording 
left doubt about the reach of congressional authority over civil rights. Contrary to the expectations of 
Senators Sumner and Howard, questions arose about whether it protected the equal rights and 
guaranteed the privileges and immunities of national citizenship. These ambiguities would be filled 
out by the Fourteenth Amendment, which is composed of several sections. The most important for 
 
47 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (Dec. 21, 1865); W. E. B. DU BOIS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION 167 (Kraus-
Thomson Org. Ltd. 1973) (1935); David Oshinsky, Worse Than Slavery (1996); BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF 
THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 274-75 (1914). 
48 Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (Civil Rights Act of 1866); ch. 86, 14 Stat. 50 (1866) (Slave Kidnaping Act); ch. 187, 14 
Stat. 546 (1867) (Peonage Act of 1867); ch. 27, 14 Stat. 385 (Act of February 5, 1867, expanding the scope of habeas 
corpus statutes). 
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purposes of reconstruction and constitutional democracy were sections 1 and 5, with the latter 
establishing substantive rights and the latter granting Congress enforcement power. 
 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
[…] 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
 
In the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment 
would prove to be the most important to advancing women’s rights, racial justice, educational 
equality, desegregation, and much more. But during the 1866 debates, congressmen tended to spend 
little time discussing the depth of its meaning. They had just finished extensive debates on the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866, and thought the broad principles annunciated about the statute, stemming to the 
nation’s founding and moral development, applied to the second reconstruction amendment. That is 
not to say they were identical laws; indeed, the Act had not included explicit equal protection, 
privileges or immunities, and due process protections. 
The original wording of the Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment granted affirmative 
legislative powers: 
 
Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to 
the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and 
to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property. 
 
However, the final version, which is now part of the official Amendment, altered that 
sentence to 
 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.  
 
This sentence contains principles on fundamental rights that were first set out in the 
Declaration of Independence, about equality by birth and rights to life and liberty, but the Supreme 
Court later interpreted the negative wording of these clauses to be a restriction grant of legislative, 
enforcement authority49. The justices aligned themselves with those statesman who had sought 
minimum change to state-federal government relations. 
 
49 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520, 532 (1997). 
   P á g i n a  | 91 
ALEXANDER TSESIS 
REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO – UFPR | CURITIBA, VOL. 64, N. 3, SET./DEZ. 2019 | P. 75 – 106 
The originally worded first section of the Fourteenth Amendment would have been an even 
more significant break with historic federalism and would have further nationalized civil rights. But 
this drastic a change to the relationship between states and the national government ruffled some 
congressmen’s feathers. Conservative legislators worried that the proposed amendment would greatly 
change the “entire structure of Government.”50 Their chief complaint was the reorientation of power 
between states and federal governments, which they were concerned could lead to centralized 
despotism. Opponents feared this would put people’s liberties at danger because they would be forced 
to petition politicians at the national seat of government rather than their state representatives51. 
During debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, some Congressmen expressed concern that such a 
change to the Constitution would empower Congress to override all state laws about ordinary 
contracts, torts, and criminal punishment52. These concerns favored structural modifications but not 
radical change. 
Opponents of the proposal that would have clarified the extent of congressional plenary 
power over civil rights argued to preserve state dominance in that area of law. They demonstrated 
willful ignorance about how much states’ rights orientation had facilitated the incidents, badges, and 
inequalities of slavery. The original Constitution permitted states to secure their citizens’ and visitors’ 
rights to slavery and discrimination. 
A new direction was needed with the cataclysm of the Civil War fresh in the people’s 
memories. This should have allowed the federal government to protect the equal liberties of all 
American people. Indeed, even in its ratified form, the Fourteenth Amendment had enormous 
potential to make fundamental rights invulnerable to states’ intrigues. Among the greatest victories 
of the Civil War was the national consensus for social change, including constitutional protections of 
universal rights. Moderates won out, to have a negatively formulated amendment, rather than the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s original affirmative wording. But there was still much hope and will among 
national legislators. 
Arguing in favor of ratification was a radical congressman from Vermont. He spoke against 
the old-time complacency with the state of inequality so common throughout the states, despite their 
inconsistency with the ideals of the nation’s founding: 
 
50 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2079-81 (Apr. 21, 1866). 
51 Id. at App. at 133 (Feb. 26, 1866)  
52 See for example the statement of Representative Robert Hale, who had abstained from voting for the Civil Rights Act 
but later helped override President’ Johnson’s veto of it. He expressed concern that the Fourteenth Amendment as it was 
originally proposed affected “all State legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedure, affecting 
the individual citizen, may be overridden […] and the law of Congress established instead.” Id. at 1063-64 (Feb. 27, 
1866). 
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What is the object of the proposed amendment? It merely gives the power to Congress to 
enact those laws which will give to a citizen of the United States the natural rights which 
necessarily pertain to citizenship. It is intended to enable Congress by its enactments when 
necessary to give to a citizen of the United States, in whatever State he may be, those 
privileges and immunities which are guarantied to him under the Constitution of the United 
States. It is intended to enable Congress to give all citizens the inalienable rights of life and 
liberty, and to every citizen in whatever State he may be that protection to his property which 
is extended to the other citizens of the State.53 
 
Despite this sentiment, the sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment feared they did not have 
the two-thirds supermajority needed to pass the Amendment. Therefore, consideration of the initial, 
positively worded proposal was postponed and never revived54. 
In its place, the Committee of Fifteen, which had been designated to formulate a draft of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, expressed the negative formulation of the Amendment’s current form. Using 
the “No state shall…” language assuaged the concerns of Congressmen, providing crucial votes, but 
created a provision that narrowed the original and was less visionary about the potential reach of 
reconstruction. A long-lasting effect of the negative formulation was also greater empowerment of 
the judiciary to second-guess whether Congress acted against actual state violations. 
Compelling testimony about the southern state recalcitrance to fulfill the demanding 
standards of the Thirteenth Amendment revealed a plethora of state violations. The worst of these 
were black codes designed to keep blacks in de facto bondage even after abolition. But other severe 
infractions were criminal behaviors that states did not prosecute. A Freedmen’s Bureau Agent 
observed that 
 
of the thousand cases of murder, robbery, and maltreatment of freedmen that have come 
before me, and of the very many cases of similar treatment of Union citizens in North 
Carolina, I have never yet known a single case in which the local authorities or police or 
citizens made any attempt or exhibited any inclination to redress any of these wrongs or to 
protect such persons.55 
 
In these circumstances federal statutes would have provided avenues for redress, where state 
remedies were unavailable or subject to racialist under-enforcement. 
Arguments in support of the Fourteenth Amendment asserted it would fulfill the promises 
of liberty of the original U.S. compact. In a speech before the House, Representative Shelby M. 
Cullom declared support of the Amendment because it would achieve those “self-evident” truths “our 
fathers” included in the Declaration and the Constitution, which in concert set down the “paramount 
 
53 Id. at 1088 (Woodbridge) (Feb. 28, 1866). 
54 Id. at 1095 (Feb. 28, 1866) (postponement). 
55 Laurent B. Frantz, Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 
1353, 1355 (1964) (quoting Freedmen’s Bureau Agent). 
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objects of government”: “[u]nion, justice, domestic tranquility, the general welfare, the securement 
of the blessings of liberty to themselves and their posterity.”56 Representative George F. Miller of 
Pennsylvania thought it unfathomable to refuse support for Section 1’s prohibition against the 
deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law because those principles are “so 
clearly within the spirit of the Declaration of Independence.”57 The sentiment that linked 
reconstruction to the birth of the nation were also shared by some officials in state governments. 
Indiana Lieutenant Governor Conrad Baker rallied an audience to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment 
to secure the equal enjoyment of natural rights, 
 
which are defined […] by our own Declaration of Independence, to be the right to 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. And it is just because the rebels in the 
South and their allies in the North, destroy these natural and absolute rights of men 
by State legislation that this amendment has become a necessity.58 
 
While the Fourteenth Amendment was a new direction for the country, it was directed at 
achieving and fulfilling of those commitments that were originally announced in the Declaration of 
Independence. 
A dramatic change to the antebellum system of federalism appeared in the fifth section of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. It granted Congress the power to enact new laws against unequal 
treatment of persons based on arbitrary racial criteria. In those heady days of reconstruction, the 
Reconstruction Congress envisioned using enforcement authority to end racial segregation, violence, 
and employment practices. 
 
7 PUTTING THE BRAKES ON WOMEN’S SUFFRAGE 
 
This rosy picture should be tempered because of language in the Fourteenth Amendment 
that deviated from the universal principle of liberal equality for the common good. Section 2 
contained the first use of “male” in the Constitution, which signaled a protection for men that was 
unavailable for women. The provision penalized states for excluding from voter rolls male inhabitants 
twenty-one year and older but created no penalty for the exclusion of women voters. That clause 
prohibited local officials from excluding black males from the franchise, but its use of “male” 
 
56 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. App. at 253 (June 16, 1866). 
57 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2510 (May 9, 1866). 
58 A Great Union Meeting of Daviess and Knox Counties, at Wheatland-- Speech of Lieutenant Governor Baker on the 
First Section of the Constitutional Amendment--It Does Not Confer the Right of Suffrage, INDIANAPOLIS DAILY J., Aug. 
15, 1866, at 2. 
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maintained the federal policy of not interfering with states disenfranchisement of women. It granted 
states the sole discretion of whether to discriminate against women based on sex. 
Long-committed abolitionists demanded that with Union victory discrimination against 
blacks and women end. For years the abolitionist movement had coupled the struggle for racial 
equality with the battle to secure women the right to vote. They regarded franchise to be essential for 
the empowerment of women. By providing half the human race no protection against overt exclusion 
from participation in representative government, even the Reconstruction Congress failed to live up 
to the universal ideals of the Declaration of Independence and Preamble to the U.S. Constitution. 
Moreover, it was a charade to think that all blacks would enjoy the status of equal citizenship when 
half of that population remained unable to vote59. Without the vote, half the nation remained in the 
despotic grip of a class system that was not based on wealth but on gender60. Only a groundswell of 
effort could end the aristocracy of sex. In the words of an 1879 petitioner to the California Congress 
supporting a state suffrage amendment, until “we feel the shackles loosen and give way […] We are 
weary of sitting in the cellar of the temple of Liberty and listening to the distressing noise of the feet 
of our brothers overhead.”61 Women suffrage had long been a rallying cry among abolitionists as a 
feature of every citizens’ hereditary entitlement. 
Feminists, led by advocates like Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, had 
petitioned Congress to add a provision to the Fourteenth Amendment that would have guaranteed 
women the right to vote. At that stage of history, suffrage was denied to them throughout all the states 
and federal territories.62 Ten thousand signatures were gathered against adding “male” to the 
Constitution. Anthony complained that women had been “left outside” the political tent “with 
lunatics, idiots and criminals.”63 
The Reconstruction Congresses and most abolitionists believed that anti-black 
discrimination needed to be tackled prior to addressing sex-based political discrimination. They 
regarded racial intolerance to be the greater of the two evils. Most thought of the period immediately 
 
59 Writing sardonically about limiting Section 2 to discrimination against males Elizabeth Cady Stanton rhetorically asked, 
“Do you believe the African race is composed entirely of males?” Letter from Stanton to Phillips, May 25, 1865, in 2 
ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AS REVEALED IN HER LETTERS, DIARY & REMINISCENCES 104-05 (Theodore Stanton & 
Harriot Stanton Blatch eds., 1922). 
60 National Woman Suffrage Association, Declaration of Rights for Women… 1876, in A CONCISE HISTORY OF WOMAN 
SUFFRAGE 302 (Mary Jo & Paul Buhle eds., 1978). 
61 WOMAN’S JOURNAL, Dec. 6, 1879, at 388. 
62 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1861-1876, at 91-92 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn 
Gage eds., photo. reprint 1985) (1881). 
63 WILLIAM L. O’NEILL, EVERYONE WAS BRAVE: A HISTORY OF FEMINISM IN AMERICA 17 (1971). 
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following the Civil War to be the “Negro’s Hour.”64 It was blacks who had suffered from the most 
appalling failures to live up to the nation’s founding value of liberal equality for the common good. 
In effect, at conventions such as those of the American Anti-Slavery Society in 1865 and 
Equal Rights Association in 1869, women’s concerns were given a back seat to black rights, rather 
than tackling both simultaneously. Stanton and Anthony rejected the notion that they would need to 
put their trust in men while they waited for some future date for achieving the nation’s commitment 
to equality. For them and their many followers, requiring women to trust their well-being to the 
predilections of an all male electorate was like trusting the British to care for the colonists’ interests. 
Stanton explained this anomaly to the New York State legislature: “The noble cannot make laws for 
the peasant, the slaveholder for the slave; neither can man make and execute just laws for woman, 
because in each case, the one in power fails to apply the immutable principles of right to any grade 
but his own.”65 Her perspective expands on the nation’s nascent demand not to be taxed without first 
participating in the legislative process66. Woman’s right to vote was commensurate with her 
enjoyment “equal personal rights and equal political privileges with all other citizens.”67 
After failing to convince the nation to include women’s suffrage in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in 1869 Representative George Julian proposed an additional change to the Constitution 
that would end discrimination against women’s ability to cast ballots68. But it would take until 1920 
for the United States to ratify the Nineteenth Amendment, prohibiting voter discrimination based on 
sex.  
 
8 ENDING OVERTLY RACIAL VOTING CRITERIA 
 
Congress stuck to its decision to proceed at first with racial discrimination. Long before it 
began in earnest to debate granting women the right to vote and even before women began receiving 
the franchise in Western states, Republicans championed blacks right to vote. Many of them believed 
 
64 American Anti-Slavery Society, NATIONAL ANTI-SLAVERY STANDARD, May 13, 1865, at 2 (speech of the abolitionist 
Wendell Phillips). 
65 Quoted in Gretchen Ritter, Jury Service and Women’s Citizenship before and after the Nineteenth Amendment, 20 L. 
& HIST. REV. 479, 495 (2002). 
66 1 GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, AMERICA: A NARRATIVE HISTORY 176, 193 (1984) (“In a flood of colonial pamphlets, 
speeches, and resolutions, debate on the Stamp Tax turned mainly on the point expressed in a slogan familiar to all 
Americans: ‘ no taxation without representation,’ a cry that had been raised years before in response to the Molasses Act 
of 1733.”). 
67 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1861-1876, at 349-50 (1881). 
68 Julian’s proposal may be found at CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (Mar. 15, 1869) and H.R.J. RES., 15, 41st 
Cong. 41 (Mar. 15, 1869). Text of the proposed amendment at EDWARD MCPHERSON, POLITICAL MANUAL FOR 1869, at 
506 (1869). 
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this to be the crowning achievement of Reconstruction. They regarded the ability to vote to be 
intrinsic to securing fundamental rights as a whole because politicians would need the ingratiate 
themselves to black and white constituents. As Congress crafted the language of the future Fifteenth 
Amendment in 1869, it could only imagine the decades of struggle that lay ahead that would be 
required to end centuries of racial, political oppression. 
While the motives for ending racial discrimination at the ballot box were partly pragmatic, 
with Republicans hoping to secure the black vote to stave off Democratic Party victory in the South, 
in large part the reasons for its passage were born of the impulse to achieve equality, which had moved 
revolutionaries and abolitionists to pursue political rights. The future president James Garfield 
eloquently explained, “I believe that the right to vote, if it be not indeed one of the natural rights of 
all men, is so necessary to the protection of their natural rights as to be indispensable, and therefore 
equal to natural rights.”69 The Amendment was also necessary for northern black voters. Between 
1865 and 1869, six of eight referenda failed in norther states70. Modification of the national 
constitution was essential to reconstruct the representative democracy that the nation had promised 
in its Declaration of Independence but failed to fully implement. 
Ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment significantly increased the number of eligible 
voters. Supporters of local autonomy, who had sought to keep blacks away from the polls even after 
abolition, were much weakened. The Amendment prohibited the use of three exclusionary criteria: 
race, color, and prior condition of servitude. Despite this crowning achievement, even this final 
amendment of the Reconstruction Era would fail to be the rebirth of freedom for which many had 
hoped. It lacked any prohibition against states’ uses of property and literacy as qualifications for 
voting. This was not an unforeseen consequence with some Senators warning during debates that 
these criteria could undermine the very purpose of the amendment71. As they predicted, in the decades 
to come, the South would rely on neutral sounding laws to keep blacks from voting and running for 
elective offices. The Fifteenth Amendment turned out to be relatively easy to undermine through 
literacy tests. 
 
 
69 James Baine, James Garfield et al., Ought the Negro to be Disfranchised? Ought He to Have Been Enfranchised?, 128 
NORTH AM. REV. 225, 225-26, 244-47 (1879). 
70 LaWanda & John H. Cox, Negro Suffrage & Republican Politics: The Problem of Motivation in Reconstruction 
Historiography, 33 J. S. HIST. 303, 318-320, 327-30 (1967). 
71 Cong. Globe, 40th Cong. 3d Sess. 861-62 (Feb. 4, 1869) (Senators Willard Warner); id. at 863 (Feb. 4, 1869) (Senator 
Oliver P. Morton); id. at 1626-27 (Feb. 26, 1869) (Senator Henry Wilson Wilson). 
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9 JUDICIAL INTERFERENCE 
 
Early judicial opinions appeared to align with the rebirth of freedom. The earliest 
interpretation of congressional reconstruction amendments came in United States v. Rhodes. The 
specific matter before Supreme Court Justice Noah Swayne, who was presiding over the case as 
designated circuit court justice, was Congress’s power to pass the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The case 
arose from a burglary committed by a white defendant against a black victim, Nancy Talbot. 
Typically, the criminal case would have been brought in a state court, but in this circumstances 
Kentucky law prohibited blacks from testifying against whites. 
In dictum to the case, Justice Swayne asserted that if Congress lacked power to pass laws 
empowering federal courts to hear such matters than the reconstruction hopes and aspirations for 
equality would be nullity, “[S]imple abolition […] would have been a phantom of delusion.” The 
Thirteenth Amendment, as he understood, had significantly altered the original Constitution, granting 
Congress with the authority to prohibit criminal discrimination72. 
The majority of the Supreme Court, however, had significantly more conservative views 
about federalism. In the decades that followed the ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, 
the Court curtailed congressional authority over civil rights. The Justices were set on diminishing 
federal jurisdiction, even in extreme cases where state laws prevented blacks from testifying against 
whites73. The Court narrowly interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1866’s provision providing a right 
to access federal district courts when a state court discriminated against black litigants, countenancing 
crimes to be committed against blacks with equanimity74. 
The most harmful opinion to Reconstruction is known as The Civil Rights Cases of 1883, 
which to this day continues to plague Congress’s legislative power over civil rights laws75. The case 
brought for alleged violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited segregation in public 
places of accommodation. Congress passed the law; therefore, it was binding throughout the country. 
The opinion significantly handicapped congressional enforcement power under Section 2 of the 
Thirteenth and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendments. 
The Court held the Fourteenth Amendment only allowed Congress to pass laws against 
public not private acts of discrimination; Congress therefore lacked authority to pass the 1875 statutes 
 
72 United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 786, 793-94 (C.C.D. Ky. 1866). 
73 Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. 581, 590-95 (1871) (holding that black witnesses to a murder could not testify in federal 
court under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but only the victim of the murder, making any testimony impossible upon 
commission of a homicide). 
74 Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, §1, 14 Stat. 27, 27. 
75 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 524 (1997). 
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regulating commercial businesses. The federal government could no longer enforce the law. This set 
off a fever of discriminatory laws in the supposedly-reconstructed South, where the notion was 
farfetched that states, without national intervention, would render segregation illegal. Rather than 
look to the nation’s founding principles, the Supreme Court rested its reasoning on a commonly 
accepted dichotomy of civil and social rights. Sumner had earlier complained that this rhetorical tool 
had been exploited against the actualization of equal rights and the continued separation of the races76. 
The majority relied on pre-Civil War notions of federalism to upend the reconstructed constitutional 
assurances of nationally recognized equal rights. 
The lone dissent to the case was one of the most eloquent jurisprudential statements in U.S. 
history. Written by Justice John Marshall Harlan it echoed founding, abolitionist, and Radical 
Republican sentiments. He argued that the Fourteenth Amendment allowed for the regulation of 
states, businesses, and individuals. Furthermore, excluding blacks from participation in publically 
available activities was also an incident of slavery that the Thirteenth Amendment was meant to 
abolish. 
The Civil Rights Cases had far reaching consequences. Later decisions, most notoriously 
Plessy v. Ferguson, recognized states right to segregate. Rather than uphold the ideals of national 
sovereignty for and by the people, the Court’s nineteenth century, narrow interpretations of the 
Reconstruction Amendments favored racial elitism opting for a Social Darwinistic notion of success 
rather than granting the national government the authority to achieve the equal liberty promised at 
the nation’s birth. 
 
10 CONCLUSION 
 
The founding principle of the United States was grafted into its Declaration of Independence 
and Preamble to the Constitution. It required government to preserve the people right to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness. The nation’s founding documents asserted that people are born with 
equal unalienable rights. Government is established to advance the general welfare and to seek the 
people’s safety and happiness. 
From the first years of the republic, however, the country failed to live up to its ideals. Racial 
and gender discriminations were mainstays of law and custom. Progressive voices called on the nation 
 
76 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 382-83 (1872). 
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to return to the aspirations of its birth, but the quest for hegemonic power kept authority in the hands 
of an elite defined by the color of its skin and by its sex. 
The cataclysmic events of the Civil War brought about the possibility of change. It was then 
that minority voices calling for an end to hypocrisy gained the reins of national power. They passed 
three constitutional amendments. One ended slavery, another provided safeguards for equal rights 
and due process, and a third secured voting rights. Each granted Congress the power to govern 
expansively, to pass necessary and proper laws rationally related to constitutional democracy. But the 
late-nineteenth century Supreme Court of the United States thwarted that effort by narrowly 
construing the Reconstruction Amendments and thereby emasculating national, legislative authority. 
After the Court found the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to be unconstitutional, it took Congress until the 
1960s to pass meaningful civil rights laws and the Supreme Court to uphold them, heralding a rebirth 
of civil rights. 
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